The "Joint Vision Statement" signed during South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's June visit to Washington has set the stage for what promises to be a highly successful visit to Seoul by President Obama later this week. Rather than rest upon its laurels, the two presidents should build upon this vision by addressing three key points that the June statement missed.

First, there is no reference to the future role of the alliance post-reunification. Second, there is no reference to the respective South Korean and U.S. roles when it comes to both denuclearization and the broader issue of Korean Peninsula peace and stability. Finally there is no reference to mid-term goals that would (or at least should) be acceptable to Pyongyang in charting a future path.

Post-Reunification: Is the alliance there merely to deal with the North Korean threat or does it have a role in preserving stability that would remain or grow in importance once the North Korea issue is resolved? Citing the important role of the alliance, both today and post-reunification, used to be a common element in joint South Korea-U.S. statements but has been missing in recent years. A failure to articulate the alliance's post-reunification role has direct relevance to how one deals with North Korea today since removing U.S. forces from the South and closing the U.S. nuclear umbrella remain primary North Korean goals. The two allies need to constantly remind Pyongyang that the future of the alliance is for South Korea and the U.S. alone to decide.

Also missing is an articulation and validation of Seoul's lead role in determining the Peninsula's future and America's commitment to this approach, despite the apparent necessity of Washington serving as a "lead negotiator" when it comes to Korean Peninsula denuclearization. One of Pyongyang's long-standing and constantly demonstrated objectives is to marginalize or delegitimize the South. This led the Clinton and Kim Young-sam administrations, in 1996, to affirm "the fundamental principle that establishment of a stable, permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula is the task of the Korean people" and that "South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace arrangement." Presidents Obama and Lee need to reaffirm this pledge.

This does not negate a direct role for Washington in denuclearization discussions with Pyongyang. To the contrary, it can help put such bilateral talks in a broader context. The South Korean government — and the Korean people — would be less concerned about direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang if they were more assured that its focus was limited to nonproliferation and denuclearization issues and that broader issues — including U.S. force structure or the future of the alliance — were not on the table.

President Lee's "Grand Bargain" — his offer of a comprehensive economic assistance package in return for denuclearization and constructive South-North dialogue — signaled that South Korea cannot allow itself to be, or even appear to be, too far removed from discussions dealing with Korean Peninsula security.

North-South "Peaceful Coexistence": The Joint Vision statement also failed to identify a mid-term goal that would not alienate Pyongyang but lay the groundwork for positive cooperation and eventual denuclearization. It's one thing to be firm in dealing with North Korea, as previous comments suggest we must. It's another to leave the North with no option other than capitulation.

One of former South Korea President Kim Dae-jung's major contributions was his decision, through his "Sunshine Policy," to set reunification aside in return for an unspecified period of peaceful coexistence. This de facto "two Koreas" solution is implied in Lee Myung-bak's "Grand Bargain" but his approach comes across as too condescending and has been soundly rejected by Pyongyang (which eagerly receives Seoul's handouts but only when they are called something else).

Nonetheless, President Lee's "Grand Bargain" can help form the basis of a joint South Korea-U.S. package deal which offers eventual recognition and acceptance within the international community plus economic and developmental assistance in return for denuclearization and the North's willingness to develop and adopt a South-North "peaceful coexistence" framework, where both sides may still profess their long-term goal (with different interpretations) of reunification but officially recognize one another's right to exist and independent sovereignty today.

The brutality of the North Korean regime makes this a bitter pill for some to swallow, but failing to deal with the North Korea that fate or history has dealt us is not going to move us closer to reaching our near- or long-term objectives.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS. He wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.