North Korean "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il is a hard person to like; he is even a harder person to ignore. And, once again, he seems to be taking delight in creating a potential showdown or crisis where otherwise none would exist.

The probability that this could very well force a hardening of the current, more flexible U.S. position toward direct negotiations with Pyongyang seems to have escaped him completely. Or, perhaps he believes that antagonistic rhetoric and threatening actions will increase rather than decrease the prospects for dialogue on his terms. At a minimum, he is once again successfully diverting attention away from the real problem at hand, which is dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capability.

In recent days, much to the dismay of the United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization — not to mention prospective passengers on South Korean airliners — Kim has warned that "security cannot be guaranteed for South Korean civil airplanes flying through the territorial air of our side and its vicinity" as a protest to routine South Korea-U.S. military exercises. This has prompted the rerouting of a number of routine civilian airline flights along previously established and approved international flight routes and once again garnered Kim much-deserved condemnation and much-desired international attention.

Even more potentially unsettling, he has asserted, despite several United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding otherwise, that North Korea will soon conduct a "satellite launch" using Pyongyang's newest long-range ballistic missile — an action that others are calling a thinly disguised missile test. This drama has played out over several months, since intelligence sources originally reported seeing launch preparations under way at the North's ballistic missile test facility. This impending missile activity (now scheduled to take place between April 4-8) has prompted calls from Washington, Tokyo, and elsewhere to shoot down the missile, or better yet, to destroy it on the launch pad before it can be fired, given its potential threat to Japan and to locations as far away as our Hawaiian Islands.

Let me hasten to add that the assessed accuracy of North Korea's long-range missiles is estimated at plus or minus 62 miles, meaning that even if the North was foolish and suicidal enough to try to shoot a missile at Hawai'i, it would pose a much greater danger to our migrating whales than to our citizens — Greenpeace, are you listening?

The Japanese have more reason to be concerned, not just because they are closer and have been more directly targeted by vehement North Korean tirades, but because many fear that even a legitimate satellite launch could very well result in missile components falling on Japanese territory. Pyongyang has announced that the first-stage booster rockets will splash down in a "danger area" within 75 miles of Japan; second-phase boosters are expected to land in the middle of the Pacific, halfway between Japan and Hawai'i.

As a result, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force plans to deploy an Aegis missile-equipped destroyer armed with interceptor missiles to the Sea of Japan in anticipation of a North Korean missile launch. While Japan has no capability to pre-emptively strike the missile on its launching pad, a senior Japanese defense official has stated "We would have no other choice but to intercept" if the missile appeared to present a direct threat to Japan. The U.S., which has the capability to pre-empt, apparently (and wisely) also has no intent to do so at this stage of the game. Instead, Washington keeps reminding Pyongyang that such actions are "unhelpful" and could have serious consequences.

Pyongyang's reaction to such threats has been considerably less nuanced: "If the enemies recklessly opt for intercepting our satellite, our revolutionary armed forces will launch without hesitation a just retaliatory strike operation not only against all the interceptor means involved but against (U.S., Japan, and ROK) strongholds," the North Korean general staff said in a statement, further asserting that "shooting our satellite for peaceful purposes will precisely mean a war."

The North's bellicose behavior is disappointing and potentially counterproductive — why would any country think it in their interest to be the first to test the resolve of a new administration, especially one in the process of reviewing its policy toward your nation? But it is hardly surprising, given the tepid response to past provocative actions. Its 2006 missile launches and nuclear test prompted two stern UNSC resolutions. Both "demanded" a halt in all ballistic missile activity; the second even authorized Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms in the case of non-compliance, but with the caveat that only "measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions" and even then only after additional UNSC consultation. This is hardly a deterrent. Nor have the "mandatory" actions — the word "sanctions" was apparently too sensitive to be used — been aggressively implemented by neighboring countries.

If the UNSC really wants to influence Kim Jong Il's behavior, it should be meeting now to unanimously decide, then privately but convincingly relay to Pyongyang, what punitive measures will be put in place should the North proceed with its illegal launch. If not, keep your eye on the sky.

Reach Ralph A. Cossa at (Unknown address).

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal. He wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.