With the chance of an extended special session unlikely, the question remains: Will the Legislature override the governor's vetoes in a one-day special override session?

Given the governor's proposed list of vetoes, the Legislature is poised to set a remarkable precedent if even the expected 28 of 31 vetoed bills are overridden by both the House and the Senate.

In 2001, a Democratic Legislature exercised its override power over a governor's veto for the first time since statehood. Ben Cayetano, a Democrat, was governor.

Since that time, the Legislature has flexed its muscle with Republican Gov. Linda Lingle three of the five years she has been in office.

During the governor's term, the Legislature has expanded its exercise of the override power. The percentage of vetoes overridden by the Legislature has increased from 18 to 46 percent between 2003 and 2005. If lawmakers move forward with overriding 28 of the 31 potential vetoes, the Legislature will override around three-fourths of Governor Lingle's vetoes.

Interestingly, in the past five years, the Legislature has not reconvened after the completion of the legislative session to override the governor's vetoes during election years. One-day special sessions have only been held in 2003 and 2005, both non-election years. In 2006, the Legislature failed to override any of the governor's 32 vetoes.

So what do these statistics say about our Legislature's exercise of its override power?

A cynic might conclude that our elected officials will only go into override session when their schedules are not packed with campaign fundraisers, coffee hours, sign-waving and walking their district.

A cynic might also speculate as to what will happen in the event that the Legislature and governor are again of the same party. Perhaps the Legislature will retreat to past practice and not be so quick to override a member of its own party, even if that governor were to raise the same type of valid concerns that the current governor now raises.

As a legislator, I believe that we cannot allow these cynical perspectives to prevail. If we do, then we lose the public's trust and further erode the public's confidence in government. Through our actions, we must demonstrate that we are a co-equal branch of government, willing to act as the check and balance envisioned by our constitutional framers. We must be willing to exercise our constitutional powers at all times, whether it is an election year or not, and regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

So, how do these beliefs about the role of the Legislature inform my approach to the governor's possible vetoes this year? As I consider the governor's potential vetoes, I have pondered the following questions for each of them: