A summary of how the Americans, Chinese, Japanese, Russians and South Koreans got to this point with the North Koreans:

On Sept. 19, the six nations issued a statement that said, in part: "The DPRK (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons" or NPT. They also "agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK." Light water reactors, or LWR, generate electricity, but it is difficult to use their nuclear fuel to make bombs.

On Sept. 20, the North Koreans reneged, effectively asserting that the "appropriate time" is now. "The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs," they declared.

On Sept. 21, they declared they were "fully ready to decisively control a pre-emptive (U.S.) nuclear attack with a strong retaliatory blow."

Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency continued in the same vein last week, saying it was "most essential" for the U.S. "to provide light water reactors to the DPRK as early as possible" as evidence that the U.S. recognized North Korea's right to have nuclear activity for "a peaceful purpose."

The latest North Korean ploy is a series of hints that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill should visit Pyongyang to be followed by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and possibly even President Bush or his father, former President George H.W. Bush.

This should be seen for what it really is, a pitch for American leaders to journey to Pyongyang to pay tribute to Kim Jong Il, to accord international stature to his regime, and to hold out hope that an agreement could be reached down the line if only the Americans would make more concessions.

Maybe Hill should go to Pyongyang for the sake of diplomatic appearances and to show the Chinese, Japanese, Russians and South Koreans that the U.S. is willing to go an extra mile in an effort to get a realistic agreement with the North Koreans. Nothing substantive, however, should be expected to come of that visit.

For Rice or either of the Presidents Bush even to consider such a venture would border on madness and would only hold out the false hope that somehow, sometime, someplace, the North Koreans will suddenly renounce their nuclear plans and actually keep their promises. Anyone who believes this will ever happen will believe that the sun will come up in the west.

What, then, to do?

The time has come to stop trying to cajole the North Koreans into a verifiable agreement and for Hill and his colleagues to pick up their briefcases and walk away. They should thank the Chinese, who have been the hosts of the negotiations, for a nice try and give the North Koreans a phone number and an e-mail address, and say that if they ever want to negotiate in good faith, let us know.

The consequences? North Korea will have a free hand to develop nuclear weapons, but it has that anyway.

Walking away will damage the endeavor to prevent more nuclear proliferation, but that has already been damaged. Iran and possibly others will be encouraged to proceed with plans to acquire nuclear weapons, but the Iranians have indicated they intend to go ahead anyway.

China has scored its first big diplomatic success, and little the Americans do will detract from that. South Korea moves away from its alliance with the U.S. day by day.

It remains to be seen whether Beijing and Seoul will be happy with a nuclear-armed North Korea next door.

So what's to lose by saying goodbye to the North Koreans?

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia.