President Bush missed some important opportunities to better define America's current and future role in Asia during his recent visit to Japan, South Korea, China and Mongolia, even while seizing the opportunity to reaffirm Washington's (and his own personal) commitment to the promotion of democracy, free and fair trade, and political and especially religious freedom.

In a major Asia policy address in Kyoto, Japan, Bush stressed that "freedom is the bedrock of America's friendship with Japan — and it is the bedrock of our engagement with Asia."

He further noted that "freedom is an outgrowth of economic prosperity," citing the examples of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. He then singled out Burma and North Korea as two examples of states "whose leaders have refused to take even the first steps to freedom."

Beijing got off easier; Bush cited China as among those states that "have taken some steps toward freedom, but they have not yet completed the journey." In noting that Taiwan had "moved from repression to democracy as it liberalized its economy," he reinforced the theme that Taipei's transition to democracy could provide a useful model for Beijing.

While Beijing took some offense at Bush's report card and his citing of Taiwan as an example, there was much in the speech, and in his subsequent visit, that should have been reassuring to China.

In Kyoto, and again in Beijing, Bush praised Chinese leaders for their initial steps down the road toward greater economic and political reform. He reaffirmed that America's "one-China policy remains unchanged" and that "there should be no unilateral attempts to change the status quo by either side." In a pre-trip interview, he said he was "optimistic there will be a peaceful resolution because I have seen cross-Straits discussions starting to take place."

Unfortunately, this dialogue has primarily been between Beijing and the leaders of Taiwan's opposition parties; President Bush missed the opportunity to stress the need for direct dialogue between Beijing and the democratically elected leadership in Taiwan, without whom there can be no peaceful resolution.

Bush patted himself on the back for attending religious services in Beijing, calling it an "affirmation of my strong belief that people should be able to worship freely." A more pointed gesture would have been to worship privately in his room, rather than at a state-sponsored church, in silent tribute to the millions of Chinese who risk persecution by worshiping at underground churches rather than attend services that are controlled by government authorities.

While freedom was identified as the bedrock of America's policies, little was said of the current (much less future) role that America's alliances and military force presence in Asia play in nurturing and protecting this freedom. In fact, in what had to have been a first in the past 50 years of presidential addresses on Asia, during the president's "major policy address" in Kyoto, the word "alliance" was never uttered. The president missed the opportunity to explain why America's East Asia alliances still make sense today and remain essential to future stability.

One major criticism of the Bush administration has been its "mixed signals" toward Beijing; the accusation that there were two China policies, one pursued by the State Department and the other by the Pentagon. In an attempt to overcome this perception, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick recently gave what was described as the definitive description of the Bush administration's second-term approach toward China, calling on Beijing to be "a responsible stakeholder in the international system."

Rather than reinforce or expand upon this concept, as many anticipated, President Bush never even repeated the "responsible stakeholder" phrase, causing many in Asia to again speculate on administration splits over China policy.

Bush's Chinese hosts demonstrated that they no longer feel it necessary to seize the opportunity of such visits to make grand gestures or provide significant "deliverables." Usually, in advance of a presidential visit, Beijing will release a few political prisoners from a U.S.-provided "wish list" as a goodwill gesture; this time Beijing unceremoniously added to the list instead. This reflects a newfound, and growing, confidence in Beijing when it comes to handling Sino-U.S. relations, which in turn makes a clear, consistent U.S. policy toward Beijing all the more essential.

Perhaps the biggest missed opportunity took place during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting in Busan, which brought together, among others, the leaders of China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the United States. The five heads of state missed the opportunity to jointly meet and definitively state their common position that North Korea must live up to its promises under the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Declaration and that it needed to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and full International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards before any serious discussion could be held on future peaceful energy programs.

This would have sent a powerful message to Pyongyang to stop stalling and to enter into serious negotiations to quickly and verifiably abandon all its nuclear weapons programs.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com), a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal (www.pacforum.org).